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Weiss: Mission Command in the Age of Sail

MISSION COMMAND IN THE AGE OF SAIL
Josh Weiss

M

ission command is a command-and-control philosophy characterized
by trust between senior and junior leaders and independent execution
of orders on the basis of a common understanding of purpose and intent.
While the concept has been part of the U.S. military’s joint doctrine since the
1980s, recently it has received more attention from senior leaders.1 In 2012,
General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
argued that the rapidly changing and increasingly complex security environment, especially when paired with an enduring period of constrained fiscal
resources, requires the joint force to be able to leverage any and all advantages
presented by “smaller units enabled to conduct decentralized operations at
the tactical level with operational/strategic implications.”2 In January 2021,
Admiral Michael M. Gilday’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Navigation
Plan (NAVPLAN) also called for the Navy to orient around commander’s
intent and to learn to “foster initiative, flexibility, and trust” throughout the
force.3 Notably, however—and appropriately, given the CNO’s central theme of
providing commander’s intent without specific
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still-untapped potential to aid in building a mission-command-education program: the age of sail.
This is not a new idea. Even though the term mission command is an anachronism relative to that era, several historians already have used the concept to
examine the age of sail. However, most of them, as well as practitioners seeking
to apply the mission-command framework better, have done so primarily by
examining Vice Admiral Lord Nelson’s tactical brilliance, as well as the idea
of the so-called Nelson Touch.5 That is a productive approach, and the Nelson
Touch does anticipate many of the core aspects of contemporary mission command. But we should not limit ourselves to Nelson’s tactics; the age of sail offers
many other useful examples of mission command, and it does so at all levels
of warfare.6 An analytical framework based on mission command can help
discover, develop, and present effectively these lessons for the many modern
practitioners seeking to apply mission command in the context of ongoing
great-power competition.
This article answers General Dempsey’s and Admiral Gilday’s calls by developing an analytical framework for mission command and proposing the full age of
sail as an area for current military officers to mine for case studies and lessons
to learn. It further demonstrates the value of this novel approach by examining
a case study from the age of sail through the lens of mission command. The
resulting analysis not only exemplifies the value to practitioners of studying the
age of sail; it also suggests some ways in which the current discourse on mission
command could be extended productively.
A MISSION-COMMAND FRAMEWORK
At its heart, mission command is about the relationship between commander
and subordinate.
The Relationship
The commander has a particular end state or specific goal in mind and must rely
on the subordinate to achieve that objective. Ideally, the commander also can
count on the subordinate to exercise discretion on the scene to take advantage
of local conditions or react to unforeseen changes in the operating environment.
This is the primary benefit of mission command. The commander also has an
idea of the boundaries or limits within which the subordinate should operate
when executing orders. Another way to say this is that the commander has an
idea of an appropriate decision space within which a subordinate can create and
choose a particular course of action.
The subordinate relies on the commander to provide the overall goal, as well as
the intent behind the objective and any limits on or boundaries to the courses of
action the subordinate may choose to achieve the desired ends. The commander
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/8
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may provide the mission orders in written or oral form, depending on the situation. The subordinate then leverages the advantage of being on the scene, as
well as an understanding of the implicit and explicit limits conveyed by the commander’s intent and orders, to develop his or her own perception of the decision
space from which to choose a particular course of action. The desired end state
of correctly executed mission command is a subordinate who, even in an environment of imperfect or incomplete information, is able confidently to leverage
any advantage deriving from proximity to the task or issue by independently
interpreting and executing orders without further guidance.7 Of course, this is
incredibly difficult to execute in the real world and requires significant effort on
the part of both commander and subordinate.
Understandably, the commander has the more difficult job with respect to
mission command. He or she must convey the objective or desired end state
clearly while also conveying sufficiently understandable and workable boundaries within which the subordinate may operate. If these boundaries overly
constrict the subordinate, the commander risks negating the ability of the subordinate to take advantage of local conditions or changes in the battle space. Put
another way, simply conveying a directive or objective—for example, “Avoid hostilities with another nation’s naval forces”—is insufficient, because it can overly
constrain a subordinate and negate any advantage provided by that subordinate’s
ability to react to local conditions. On one hand, a subordinate may interpret such
direction so strictly that it precludes protecting allies from attack; on the other
hand, it could prevent the subordinate from taking advantage of a rapidly developing or unforeseen situation. Therefore, to leverage mission command fully, a
commander must create and communicate clearly an acceptable and appropriate
decision space within which the subordinate can act.
When creating the limits of such a decision space, the commander must consider three interrelated areas:
1. First and most importantly, the commander must explain to the
subordinate the intent behind the orders. A shared understanding of
why the commander wants something done, and any other reasoning
behind the orders, will help align the commander’s and the subordinate’s
decision spaces, minimizing the potential that the subordinate will select
a course of action that is unacceptable to the commander. It also will
provide maximum opportunity for a subordinate to take advantage of
opportunities on scene.
2. Second, the commander must understand and incorporate the
subordinate’s personal history, personality, and other factors contributing
to his or her mind-set when both explaining intent and issuing orders.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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This will help the commander shape the orders to the particular strengths
and weaknesses of the subordinate.
3. Finally, the commander must consider the specific language of the orders.
Informed by an understanding of the subordinate to whom the orders will
be issued, the commander must take care to use language that provides
the subordinate sufficient maneuvering room while not allowing too free
a hand.
Careful analysis and consideration of these three areas will help a commander
issue effective mission-style orders and shape an appropriate decision space for
the subordinate.
The subordinate’s job is less complicated but still difficult. On receipt of orders, the subordinate must filter the language of those orders through his or her
understanding of the commander’s intent and the desired end state to create a
perceived decision space from which to choose a particular course of action.
Appropriately executed mission command ensures that the two decision spaces
overlap to a significant degree, even if not completely. If needed, and if time and
communications permit, the subordinate should seek clarification or further
guidance. The subordinate should take advantage of any information or circumstances available on scene and select a course of action that stays within the
bounds of the intended decision space.
Trust is the most significant prerequisite for successful execution of mission
command. Both the commander issuing the orders and the subordinate executing
FIGURE 1
THE MISSION-COMMAND RELATIONSHIP
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them must accept the risk of all possible outcomes.8 In other words, mission command is not a panacea; it does not guarantee success. Even a subordinate with a
perfect understanding of commander’s intent and executing beautifully written
orders still may choose an improper or ineffective course of action. The subordinate may fail to achieve an objective or may do so in a manner contradictory to
what the commander intended. So, both commander and subordinate must trust
each other. In mission command, the commander’s trust of the subordinate should
be considered part of his or her knowledge of the subordinate, as previously discussed. An extra dimension exists for the subordinate, however. Subordinates
must trust that commanders will understand their actions and protect them from
irrational or excessive punishment resulting from the subordinates exercising
discretion or interpreting commanders’ orders. If subordinates do not have this
trust in their commanders, they naturally will be unwilling to take risks or exercise
initiative—effectively negating the prime benefit that mission command provides.
The Possibilities
A matrix of four mission-command possibilities can be developed for application
to events, including during the age of sail, by laying out the roles of and requirements for both the commander and the subordinate. Each of the four elements in
the matrix represents a possible combination of circumstances in the application
of mission command, and therefore a unique framework by which to question,
understand, and teach. None of the questions offered below should be taken to
apply only to the possibility alongside which it is presented; in many cases, the
questions will apply to multiple possibilities. Nor should the questions presented
below be considered exhaustive; they are presented merely to show the outline of
a possible framework for historical analysis.
The first possibility represents the best execution of mission command. In
such scenarios, the subordinate’s derived decision space overlaps significantly
with the intended decision space the commander provided through mission orders and explanation of intent. The subordinate then chooses a course of action
from this shared decision space that leads to the commander’s desired outcome.
Historians and practitioners should apply several questions to scenarios that fall
into this category. What factors led to the two decision spaces overlapping so
well? Was it in the way the commander understood the subordinate’s limitations?
Was it because the subordinate trusted the commander to provide protection
from unintended consequences? Did the overlap of the decision spaces lead to
the successful outcome, or was it some other factor?
The second possibility is best described as an adequate exercise of mission command. In such scenarios, the subordinate chooses a course of action from his or
her decision space that leads to the commander’s desired outcome. However, the
chosen course of action lies outside the decision space from which the commander
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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intended the subordinate to
choose. In other words, the
subordinate got the job done,
but did so in a manner that
the commander did not intend. This possibility should
not be confused with the best
execution of mission command simply because the subordinate achieved the desired
outcome. Because mission
command involves a relationship, it is at its best when the
chosen course of action comes
from a shared decision space.
Historians and practitioners
should ask why the two decision spaces did not overlap to
include the successful course
of action ultimately chosen.
Did the commander convey
intent poorly, or did the words
Subordinate’s Course of Action Falls:
of the orders overly constrain
Within Commander’s
Outside Commander’s
Desired Decision Space
Desired Decision Space
the subordinate from exercisPossibility no. 1:
Possibility no. 2:
ing initiative? Was there a
best execution of
adequate execution of
viable course of action that
mission command
mission command
Possibility no. 4:
Possibility no. 3:
lay within the shared decision
likely not mission
failure of mission
space? Why did the subordicommand related
command
nate choose a course of action
that lay outside the decision space the commander had provided?
The third possibility is similar to the second in that the subordinate chooses
a course of action inside his or her own decision space but outside that intended
by the commander. However, in this case, the subordinate fails to achieve the
commander’s desired outcome. This is best described as a failure of mission
command. In addition to the questions presented for the second possibility, here
practitioners and historians should focus on whether mission-command-related
issues contributed to the failure to achieve the desired outcome. Would the desired outcome have been achieved if the subordinate had chosen a particular
course of action within the commander’s intended decision space? Or was the
failure unrelated to a mission-command issue?

FIGURE 2
FOUR MISSION-COMMAND POSSIBILITIES

Mission
succeeds
Mission
fails
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The fourth possibility likely does not relate to mission command at all. Here,
the subordinate chooses a course of action from a decision space that overlaps
with the commander’s intended decision space yet fails to achieve the desired
outcome. In other words, these scenarios may involve issues that even mission
command could not have solved, such as those caused by chance or the fog of
war. Here practitioners and historians should attempt to identify the factors that
caused the chosen course of action to fail. Was it simply that, in war, bad things
sometimes happen? Did the shared decision space contain a course of action that
might have led to the desired outcome? If so, why was it not chosen?
Taken together, these four possibilities create a useful framework by which to
analyze events from the age of sail.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE AGE OF SAIL
The age of sail is a particularly useful era to mine for mission-command-related
lessons, because of the challenges inherent in the age. The communications and
strictly military-related challenges at the tactical level are well known and have
been explored.9 However, the same challenges existed at the operational and strategic levels of war as well, and those are particularly relevant to the political and
diplomatic challenges facing today’s military leaders in a renewed great-power
competition. Because of slow communication during the age of sail and the
global nature of many of the wars fought, officers on station—that is, the subordinates—frequently were required to use their initiative and to make decisions
at the operational and strategic levels of war in an environment characterized
by incomplete or imperfect information. Likewise, ministers at home—that is,
the commanders—had to try to shape those officers’ behavior through orders
that could take months to arrive, if they did at all, and which could have become
irrelevant by the time they did. There are clear parallels from this information
environment to modern militaries’ concerns with disruption of today’s communication and coordination capabilities at all levels of war.10 The case study examined here demonstrates those parallels and provides both a particularly rigorous
test of the developed mission-command framework and an excellent example of
the valuable lessons that such complicated events can yield.
Less clear but no less important are the parallels from the age of sail to today’s
information-rich environment. The same constant-communication capabilities
that militaries worry about losing in the opening days of modern combat likely
are acting to degrade subordinates’ abilities to exercise initiative. John Nelsen
neatly demonstrated this in his 1987 article “Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle.” The situation he anticipated then—which has come to pass
today—was that newly developed communications technology both allows and
incentivizes commanders to micromanage subordinates, to the detriment of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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the subordinates’ abilities and willingness to practice initiative to advantage.11
Because commanders in the age of sail did not have the option of constant communications, they naturally developed methods to communicate within, and to
develop subordinates’ abilities to deal with, a sparse information environment.
Modern commanders seeking to prepare their subordinates for a severely
degraded communications and information environment in a future conflict can
learn from their predecessors in the age of sail. It is time, then, to apply the analytical framework to a specific case study and demonstrate the value of this approach.
THE CASE STUDY
Between 30 June and 11 July 1815, Rear Admiral Sir Philip Durham and Lieutenant General Sir James Leith, respectively the British naval and land-force
commanders in chief of the Leeward Islands in the Caribbean Sea, engaged in a
remarkable dispute regarding the island of Guadeloupe, whose governor had declared allegiance to the recently returned Napoléon Bonaparte. The dispute was
carried out via a series of lengthy and legalistic letters between the two officers.
The missives centered on whether the British forces should, or even were permitted to, intervene militarily to retake Guadeloupe in the name of the restored
Bourbon king, Louis XVIII.12
The correspondence between the commanders makes clear that each was
attempting to interpret imprecisely worded orders to fit a novel situation, and
that this effort was complicated significantly by their inability to communicate
quickly with ministers back in Britain. The fundamental problem was that the
two commanders reported to different ministers in London, and the two ministers had issued them different orders. Leith’s orders came from the Secretary of
State for War and the Colonies, Henry, Earl Bathurst, while Durham reported
to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Robert Dundas, Viscount Melville. Bathurst
communicated effectively to Leith the end state he envisioned—provision of
support to the Bourbon forces in the West Indies—while Melville constrained
Durham, forcing him to wait for a positive order to engage in any hostilities. In
other words, the two commanders on the scene were operating in two different
mission-command scenarios.
As will become clear, though, the episode is not as simple as a case of two commanders with two different sets of orders. A close reading of the correspondence
between Durham and Leith demonstrates that Durham did not understand Melville’s desired end state and Melville did not understand the pressures that were
weighing on Durham. Herein lies the value of mission command as an analytical
tool; it encourages historians to delve into the mind-sets of the commanders on
the spot, as well as those higher in the chain of command, and it does so in a
language familiar to modern-day practitioners. When we do so here, not only do
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/8

8

Weiss: Mission Command in the Age of Sail

WEISS

101

we plumb useful depths for mission-command-related lessons, but we also revise
our historical understanding of the particulars of this case.
Events in the West Indies during and after Napoléon’s escape from Elba in
February 1815 have received very little attention. Recent accounts of the naval
history in the West Indies during this period either focus on American commerce
raiding toward the end of the War of 1812 or do not touch on events in the West
Indies at all.13 Nor is the nineteenth-century historiography much better.14 In
both cases, the lack of interest in the region is understandable, given the enormity
of the shadow cast by Napoléon’s return to France, his defeat at Waterloo, and his
exile to Saint Helena.
The Commanders
The few accounts we have of the dispute between Durham and Leith flow entirely
from Durham’s version of the events. James Ralfe’s 1828 biography of Durham—
very likely sourced from the admiral himself—blames the dispute on Leith and
concludes that the root cause was “an excess of zeal on one part [Leith’s], and
the exercise of sound discretion on the other.”15 Durham’s memoirs, published
posthumously in 1846, come to a similar conclusion, although they do not attack
Leith directly.16 The only modern analysis of the dispute relies heavily on both
these sources, as well as three letters from Durham to Leith. It concludes that it
was “Leith’s belief that his letter from Bathurst clearly obligated him to restore
by force of arms the usurped royal authority on [Guadeloupe], and Durham’s insistence that his instructions dated 26 March prevented him from co-operating”
that caused the dispute.17 In fact, a closer examination of the events in question
suggests a different conclusion, as this article will demonstrate. In addition to
applying a mission-command framework, the analysis relies on additional correspondence from Durham and other previously unconsidered perspectives of the
events on Guadeloupe and Martinique during Napoléon’s return.18
One new perspective on the dispute between Durham and Leith is that of
the French general Eugène Édouard Boyer de Peyreleau, who was the principal
deputy to the governor of Guadeloupe, Charles Alexandre Léon Durand, comte
de Linois. In a pamphlet published in 1849, General Boyer provided commentary
on the internal deliberations and a detailed view of the events leading up to the
government of Guadeloupe declaring allegiance to the restored Bonapartist government on 18 June—the event that was the chief cause of the Durham-Leith dispute (occurring, coincidentally, on the same day as the Battle of Waterloo). When
considering Boyer’s account, however, it is important to consider that, while both
he and Linois were sent home to face trial after Napoléon’s final defeat, he was
the only one to face any blame. He was sentenced to death for his role, although
this quickly was commuted to a lifetime prison sentence, of which he actually

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022

9

102

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [2022], No. 3, Art. 8

served only three years. As Boyer indirectly makes clear in his introduction, he
published his pamphlet primarily to reclaim his reputation and to set the “public
record” straight after Linois’s death.19 Therefore, aside from particulars such as
dates, places, and names of participants, his account should be treated skeptically.
Nevertheless, it provides a helpful French perspective on the dispute—which,
after all, hinged on the behavior of the French in the West Indies.
In addition to ignoring the French perspective, the existing studies of the dispute also have failed to examine how the backgrounds of the British and French
commanders in chief shaped their actions in the summer of 1815. When he
was appointed to command Royal Navy (RN) forces in the Leeward Islands in
November 1813, Rear Admiral Durham’s career was approaching its apex. In the
thirty-seven years since he joined the Royal Navy, he had survived the disastrous
sinking of Royal George, successfully commanded several ships and a squadron,
fought and been wounded at Trafalgar in 1805, and amassed considerable fame
and fortune.20 He had made an excellent first impression in the Leeward Islands
by capturing two French frigates while en route to his new command. American
privateers were preying on shipping throughout the station, so Durham immediately set about employing his squadron to capture them, and his efforts earned
lavish praise from the British merchants in the Caribbean.21
But Durham was eager to return to England to commence his postwar career,
so shortly after the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1814 he applied for relief. While
waiting for the identified officer to arrive and relieve him, including through the
winter and early spring of 1814–15, Durham occupied his time and his squadron
with several tasks. These included continuing protection of merchant ships while
the Treaty of Ghent awaited ratification and implementation, removing British
troops and colonists from the West Indian islands being returned to Denmark
and France, and sending several ships of his squadron home to England as part
of the general drawdown of the Royal Navy.22
As governor in chief and commander of the British land forces in the Leeward
Islands, Leith found himself in a position similar to Durham’s. Having served
with distinction in the Peninsular War at Bussaco, Badajoz, and Salamanca, he
received his appointment to the Leeward Islands on 15 February 1814. Arriving
in the islands later that spring, Leith’s primary concern was handing over the
administration and control of the captured islands to the newly arriving Danish
and French authorities—not a simple task. The handover of Guadeloupe, which
was completed in early December 1814, proved particularly challenging for all
involved; apparently Leith’s personal intervention was required to overcome
disagreements between the outgoing British governor and the incoming French
administration. Adding to Leith’s difficulties in carrying out his duties was the
fact that he had no legal authority over his naval counterpart or the troopships
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/8
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in the region, and therefore he could not move troops around the station unless
Durham agreed to supply the means to do so.23
On the French side, the governors of Martinique and Guadeloupe appointed
by Louis XVIII’s newly restored Bourbon government were reliant on a prerevolutionary ordinance for the organization of the colonies. The two governors were
in charge of military matters, while administration and finances were left to an
intendant and a superior counsel. The first French ships of the expedition to
reclaim the West Indies for the Bourbons left France on 1 September 1814, while
the governors set sail in late October.24
The new governor of Guadeloupe, the comte de Linois, had served in the
Bourbon, revolutionary, and Imperial French navies, seeing notable service in the
Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean as part of the last two. Linois’s active service
ended when he was injured in a battle with Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, RN,
during his return to France in March 1806 and taken prisoner to England. Linois
spent the remainder of the war there, until Napoléon’s abdication in 1814. While
captive in England he was created Baron of the Empire and awarded a pension
of four thousand livres per year. Linois arrived on Guadeloupe and assumed his
post as governor on 14 December 1814.25
Unlike Linois, Pierre René Charles Marie, comte de Vaugiraud, was a staunch
royalist. He was made a vice admiral and appointed governor of Martinique in
June 1814 after having spent the previous twenty-four years in exile in London. It
also is worth noting that in 1795 Vaugiraud was serving as the pilot on Durham’s
Anson off Noirmoutier when the ship ran aground—resulting in a threat from
Durham to hang him. Vaugiraud arrived on the island in early December. His
first several months there appear to have been fairly routine, concerned mostly
with the mechanics of the restoration of Bourbon rule and the reestablishment
of commerce to and from the island. However, Vaugiraud’s knowledge of Linois’s
background likely played a part in his decision to order the captain of the royalist
ship L’Hermione on 15 December 1814 to bring him an account of the situation
on Guadeloupe, Linois’s attitude, and any Bonapartist activities there.26 Clearly,
during the winter and early spring of 1815 some tension existed between the two
French governors.
The Islands
It is important next to understand the relative economic and strategic unimportance of the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique compared with other islands
in the West Indies. It is true that sugar, and the ability to produce it inexpensively using enslaved labor, made West Indian colonies very valuable possessions
throughout the eighteenth century. Furthermore, strategically, the West Indies
provided a convenient peripheral theater in which a nation could distract its
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opponent or force a diversion of forces away from another theater. In fact, in
every war between 1748 and 1815 the British conducted major operations there
to disrupt French and Spanish trade. From Britain’s wartime perspective, the
importance of Guadeloupe and Martinique was not in bringing their cane land
under British rule but in bolstering Britain’s domestic sugar market by destroying the islands’ capacity to produce sugar, and thereby denying the French the
ability to profit from them. Later, the possessions could be used as diplomatic
bargaining chips in peace negotiations. So, for instance, at the end of the Seven
Years’ War in 1763, Britain effectively traded both islands, along with a number
of other West Indian possessions, back to France in exchange for Canada, and
in the 1802 Treaty of Amiens it gave back Martinique for no directly related
concessions.27
A similar line of thinking seems to have influenced the decision by Robert
Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, Britain’s foreign secretary, to return the islands
to Louis XVIII in the 1814 Treaty of Paris. Castlereagh appears to have returned
Martinique and Guadeloupe solely as a salve for France’s national pride, as that
country’s borders on the continent were being driven back to the status quo ante
bellum, and British sugar production on Jamaica, Trinidad, and Saint Lucia and at
Demerara was not threatened by the resumption of French production on Guadeloupe and Martinique.28 As a result of the treaty, during the winter and spring
of 1815 Leith and Durham busied themselves redistributing colonists and naval
and land forces to restore French control over the islands.29
The French merchant interest, on the other hand, assigned more economic and
strategic importance to returning the islands to their control, maintaining peace,
and restarting trade. The 1814 Treaty of Paris also gave the French government
the right to attempt to reconquer Saint-Domingue (Haiti) from the regime that
had held control of the island since a successful slave revolt during the early days
of the French Revolution. This possibility gave the traders and merchants who
had suffered since the onset of the French Revolution, both in France and in the
colonies, hope of restoring their former glory and prosperity.30 They were eager
to be rid of their overbearing former British overlords; they hoped to resume a
more profitable life under the rule of Louis XVIII’s newly installed government.31
Napoléon’s Return
Napoléon’s unanticipated return from Elba, and the response of the French armed
forces to that return, had global implications. While the allies meeting in Vienna
were quick to declare Napoléon an outlaw and to ratify the seventh coalition
on 13 March, a week after learning of his escape, Napoléon’s return nonetheless
caused significant angst and debate within the British government.32 The debate
did not center on whether Britain should oppose Napoléon’s resumption of his
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throne; in fact, on 18 March, even before Napoléon arrived in Paris, the Duke
of Wellington was able to inform Castlereagh of the allies’ decision to renew the
Treaty of Chaumont, which bound each signatory to supply 150,000 troops for
a common defense against Napoléon’s expected aggression. The military provisions of the treaty were “instantly accepted” by the British government after it was
signed on 25 March, with an immediate commitment of £2 million in subsidies
to be paid to continental powers for the raising of one hundred thousand troops
to help Britain meet its quota.33
Instead, the debate focused on what ends the British government publicly
could commit itself to attempting to achieve through the use of military force
against Bonaparte. The government was particularly concerned with whether the
Bourbon monarchy was worth restoring. Louis XVIII’s abrupt flight from Paris to
Lille and then to Belgium within a span of nineteen days did not help his supporters in Britain.34 Neither, however, did his flight soften the British government’s
intent to fight Napoléon. After hearing the news of Louis’s departure, Castlereagh
wrote to Wellington that Britain’s involvement must be of “the largest scale. . . .
[Y]ou must inundate France with force in all directions.”35
The final results of this debate, and the fate of Napoléon himself, have been
studied extensively and need not be addressed further here. However, the fact
that this debate occurred from the moment the British government and its ministers learned of Napoléon’s return on 10 March until the end of May serves as an
important backdrop to the orders those ministers sent to their respective commanders in the West Indies during this period.36
The Orders
The first letter that Melville wrote to Durham after Napoléon’s escape was a cancelation of his relief as naval commander in chief of the Leeward Islands station.
Writing shortly after news of Napoléon’s return reached London on 10 March,
Melville told him about Napoléon’s escape, praised Durham’s conduct, and specifically mentioned that the admiral had given “such great satisfaction” to the
merchants on his station. Melville concluded, “Should, however, peace not be
disturbed, I will take care to send out an officer to relieve you.”37
Having disappointed Durham’s hopes of a return to England, Melville then
wrote the order that would drive and guide Durham’s conduct for the next four
months. Because a subordinate’s understanding of the intent behind a commander’s orders and how the commander conveys that intent are so important,
Melville’s orders of 26 March are worth quoting in their entirety here.
The vessel that conveys this letter and other despatches for you, carries out orders
from Louis XVIII to the Governments of Martinique and Guadaloupe [sic], to hold
those islands in his name.
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I hope they will obey the requisition, but if they should not, and if on the contrary
they declare for Bonaparte, it will nevertheless be your duty (indeed it is scarcely
necessary for me to remind you of it) to abstain from any hostile acts against his flag,
unless the vessels which carry it should commit any act of aggression against British
ships, or until you learn hostilities between France and this country have actually
commenced. If Martinique and Guadaloupe continue faithful to Louis XVIII, and
their vessels carry his flag, they must of course be treated as friends.38

On the face of it, Melville’s orders seem to differ significantly from the
attitude of the rest of the British government. He wrote them two weeks
after the allies in Vienna had declared Napoléon an outlaw and a week after
Wellington had informed Castlereagh of the allies’ intent to renew the Treaty
of Chaumont and commit 150,000 troops to Napoléon’s defeat. However,
Melville’s orders still fit within the overall response of the government. During this period, even as the navy continued to deal with the ongoing postwar
reduction in the strength of its squadrons around the world, including in
the Leeward Islands, the service, like the rest of the British government, was
dealing with the shock of Napoléon’s return, and Melville faced the growing potential of a renewal of a worldwide war in which the Royal Navy was
likely again to play a major part in protecting the British homeland and its
possessions overseas.
Looked at this way—with the benefit of hindsight and the knowledge of
how the greater conflict concluded—Melville’s desired end state seems clear;
he did not want to provoke unnecessary conflict in the West Indies.39 However, his guidelines for acceptable action by Durham are less clear, serving to
obscure his true intent. Durham was neither to act aggressively nor to allow
his actions to start an unprovoked conflict with any French ship, regardless
of whether it flew the white Bourbon flag or the imperial tricolor. Crucially,
what was less clear was what Durham should do, or even was permitted to
do, if events in the West Indies exceeded the scope of Melville’s orders before
new ones could be sent across the Atlantic. In the end, Melville’s language is
extremely rigid; it is that of a commander restricting too severely the options
available to a subordinate in the field. “[T]o abstain from any hostile acts” gave
Durham very little room to maneuver as circumstances changed, and the focus
on “hostilities between France and this country” only confused matters. After
all, the allies claimed to be taking up arms against French forces as allies of
France—they merely were seeking to capture the outlaw Napoléon Bonaparte.
Whether France and Britain actually were at war seems a simple question
on its face, but in the context of Napoléon’s return Melville severely limited
Durham’s available courses of action and confused his understanding of the
evolving events in Europe.
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On 10 April, amid efforts to supply and prepare the Duke of Wellington’s army
on the Continent after Britain’s official commitment to the renewed Treaty of
Chaumont on 25 March, Bathurst wrote his orders to Leith. As with Melville’s
orders to Durham, they are worth quoting in their entirety here.
The events which have recently taken place in France give too much reason to believe
that some endeavours may be made by the party attached to Bonaparte to gain
possession of the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique and there is ground for apprehension that the governors of those islands may not be able without assistance to
maintain the authority of His Most Christian Majesty.
Under these circumstances I am commanded to signify to you the pleasure of His
Royal Highness the Prince Regent that in the event of any requisition being made to
you for assistance for such a purpose from the officers in command in those islands
you should without delay afford from the force under your command such assistance
as the means placed at your disposal may be able to furnish.40

Unlike Melville’s orders, these clearly communicate Bathurst’s desired end
state to Leith: retention of the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique under the
control of Louis XVIII. In further contrast to Melville’s orders, Bathurst’s are
those of a commander setting a goal for the on-scene subordinate while leaving
significant room for that subordinate to choose how best to accomplish that goal.
His full intention is clear: the islands must be retained for the king of France without removing Leith’s ability to do his job, which included protecting the British
colonies under his charge. By using open and permissive language, Bathurst gave
Leith significant room to maneuver and to match his actions to the situation. This
will become important later.
As evidenced by the first sentence of Melville’s orders of 26 March to Durham, the French ministers also felt the need to send prescriptive orders to Vaugiraud and Linois in the immediate aftermath of Napoléon’s return. The Bourbon
minister of the navy and the colonies wrote to Vaugiraud on 12 March, sending
him copies of newspapers announcing the return of “l’usurpateur.” Louis’s ambassador in London wrote to both governors on 24 March urging them to hold
their islands in the name of Louis XVIII. However—likely understanding the
different backgrounds of the two governors—the ambassador gave additional
instructions that neither of them should permit any new forces to enter Guadeloupe, nor should they hand over the administration of the colony without a
personal order from the king countersigned by Blacas d’Aulps, the minister of
the king’s household. Another potential reason for the firm tone of the ambassador’s order is that the king apparently was considering permanent retirement
to Guadeloupe and Martinique if Bonaparte was ultimately successful in his
return.41 Much like Melville’s, these orders served to box in the French commanders on station rigidly.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022

15

108

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [2022], No. 3, Art. 8

As the Bourbons’ situation in France worsened, however, even those prescriptive orders did not provide sufficient confidence to Louis’s government. On 18
April, Blacas wrote to Vaugiraud and Linois, as well as to the intendant of Guadeloupe, to inform them that the king had appointed Vaugiraud governor general of
both Martinique and Guadeloupe. He gave Louis’s reasoning for this change to be
the events that had come to pass in France. Implicit, however, is Louis’s ministers’
concern that military and government leaders continued to declare for Napoléon,
leaving the royal court anxious to consolidate power in the West Indies in the
French commander that it trusted.42
The Orders Delivered
By the third week of April, then, both the British and French ministers in Europe
had cast their dice, from a mission-command perspective. On both sides, intent
was imbued, intentionally or otherwise, into orders. On the French side, Louis
XVIII’s government decided it did not have the right military commander on
Guadeloupe for the unfolding situation. All the orders and commands then were
sent on the long journey to the West Indies, to be interpreted and carried out by
the disparate group of commanders.
In this period, instructions from ministers in Europe took between one and
two months to reach their intended recipients in the West Indies. For the British,
the primary mail route to the West Indies originated, like all other wartime mail
service to overseas destinations, from Falmouth in the southwest of England. The
service followed a relatively consistent path from Britain to the West Indies that
was designed to take advantage of prevailing winds and geography. Occasionally,
the first stop for the ships after their departure from Britain was Lisbon—three of
the twelve packets called there in 1815. Next, the ships would sail to the northeast
coast of South America before proceeding into the Leeward Islands, where typically they would stop at the various colonies in the region. Barbados, followed by
Dominica and Antigua, were the colonies visited most often in 1815. Finally, from
the West Indies the packets would take about a month to return by a more northerly route to Falmouth, where they would start the cycle again.43
Between the fall of 1814 and the end of 1815, the route to the West Indies was
serviced by approximately a dozen packets that departed on a roughly monthly
schedule. On all the routes that the packet service maintained, the primary determinant of the scheduling seems to have been the availability of the packet ships
themselves; however, if important mail needed to be sent and no packets were
available, mail also could be consigned to any available RN vessels.44
On the French side, Louis XVIII’s flight to Ghent meant that his government
would not be able to rely on the French postal service to relay instructions to his
commanders in the West Indies; instead, his ministers would have to rely on the
British postal system for assistance. As the opening line of Melville’s 26 March
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orders to Durham points out, the packet carrying his orders also carried orders
to the governors of Guadeloupe and Martinique. This also is likely why Blacas,
when notifying Vaugiraud of his appointment as governor general in the West
Indies, directed him to relay all reports on the colonies through Louis XVIII’s
ambassador in London. Constrained by similar difficulties, Bonaparte’s newly
restored imperial minister of the navy and the colonies sent his first letter to
Vaugiraud and Linois via a French armed schooner.45
Also inherent in this timeline is the assumption that the packet ship, warship,
or merchant vessel entrusted with the mail makes it to its destination safely. However, packets faced many risks in the early nineteenth century, including falling
victim to a competing nation’s warships or privateers, or simply to the elements.
This was true especially for transatlantic packets during the War of 1812, which
saw the average loss of mail-carrying ships at sea jump from two a year to seven
after June 1812. Luckily for Leith and Durham, however, the last loss of packets
to any source in the West Indies in 1815 occurred in February, when an American privateer took Lady Mary Pelham on the latter’s return trip to Falmouth, and
in April, when Duke of Montrose foundered on rocks off Barbados, managing
nonetheless to save the mailbags. Correspondence successfully and regularly
arrived in the West Indies throughout the entirety of the Hundred Days.46 Of
course, neither Bathurst nor Melville, nor Leith nor Durham, could have known
this during the spring and summer of 1815; instead, they would have been used
to the opposite, with the timely arrival of guidance being something on which
they could not depend.
From a mission-command perspective, the slow and semireliable system
responsible for conveying orders and guidance from ministers and commanders at home to subordinates in the West Indies created a dangerous information
environment in the spring and summer of 1815. Despite the generally reliable,
stable, and periodic arrival of mail from Britain, the potential for the loss of
orders, combined with the significant travel time, meant that the British and
French commanders in chief were operating in an environment characterized
by incomplete and imperfect information—or at least the fear of flawed and late
information. This, in turn, placed even greater emphasis on the latitude provided
to those commanders in the orders that were about to begin arriving.
The Course of Events in the Islands
The orders and other communications arrived in quick succession. Newspapers
carrying the first reports of Napoléon’s escape from Elba and the upheaval in
France reached Barbados on 28 April in the mailbags saved by the crew of the
sinking packet Duke of Montrose.47 The news reached Guadeloupe on 29 April.
A few days later, on 2 May, after having stopped at Martinique, HMS Badger arrived at Guadeloupe with the 24 March orders from Louis XVIII’s ambassador in
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London, before the ship proceeded on to Barbados. Melville’s orders to Durham
of 26 March also arrived in Badger, reaching Barbados on 8 May, but Durham
actually did not receive them until a few days later, as he was off on an initial
reconnoiter of the situation on Guadeloupe. It is not known exactly when Leith
received his 10 April orders from Bathurst or by what means he received them.
However, Durham, in a letter to the Admiralty dated 28 May, stated that Leith
had received instructions to help Linois and Vaugiraud maintain their islands
loyal to Louis XVIII. On the basis of recorded packet sailing and arrival dates
during this period, these instructions could have been delivered only by warship or private vessel, and they likely arrived shortly after Durham’s orders from
Melville.48
On Martinique and Guadeloupe, as in France, news of Napoléon’s return created immediate difficulties for the Bourbon governments. In early May, both
governors, fearful of their respective populations’ increasingly pro-Napoléon
sentiments, reached out to Leith to ask for assistance. Vaugiraud, facing imminent mutiny from two-thirds of the 1,300-man garrison on Martinique, swiftly
communicated with Leith and concluded a signed agreement with the British
governor on 20 May to allow British troops to garrison forts on Martinique as
auxiliary forces for the preservation of Louis XVIII’s authority.49
On Guadeloupe, Linois, concerned with rumors spreading across the island
of the return of the hated “Anglais” and with his government’s inability to keep
news from the inhabitants about Napoléon’s increasing success in France, wrote
to Leith on 3 May asking for a British man-of-war to patrol off both Martinique
and Guadeloupe.50 He requested that this patrol “intercept any vessels with the
tri-coloured flag,” and Durham, not yet having received the 26 March orders
from Melville, complied with the request immediately.51 Durham and Leith then
both sailed at once for Guadeloupe, arriving 13 May, to inform Linois that the
requested patrol would be established, to offer him assistance, and to request an
in-person interview. Likely fearing the effect of his being seen conferring with
British commanders in chief, subsequent to rumors among the general population of an imminent reinvasion of the island by the hated British, Linois refused
an in-person interview. However, he and Leith continued to communicate by
letter for the remainder of May, culminating with Leith’s offer on 26 May to send
an auxiliary force to garrison the forts of Guadeloupe. Linois declined the offer, citing his orders from Louis XVIII’s ambassador in London to allow no new
forces to enter the colony without express permission. On hearing of his refusal,
Vaugiraud wrote to Linois on 6 June counseling him that the ambassador’s orders
were intended solely to exclude any new French troops from Europe, and that he
should allow British help in maintaining the colony’s loyalty to the French king.
Linois refused again.52
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Durham and Leith, both newly in receipt of guidance from their respective
ministers in England, swiftly made preparations to assist Vaugiraud. By 27 May,
Leith had assembled two thousand soldiers, along with artillery, provisions, and
other stores, at Saint Lucia. Having no authority over the troopships or Durham
himself, Leith requested the admiral’s assistance to ferry the British troops from
Saint Lucia to Martinique as soon as Vaugiraud was ready to receive them.53 Durham readily, and without any apparent argument, agreed, arriving at Saint Lucia
with the required transports on 31 May.54
While making preparations to deliver the British troops to Vaugiraud on
31 May, Durham reported to the Admiralty Linois’s refusal of Leith’s similar
offer of an auxiliary force. In his missive, Durham described the deteriorating
situation on Guadeloupe yet defended Linois’s loyalty. He believed that Linois
was basing his refusal on his inability “to permit an English Soldier to land[,]
as almost every Man on that Island ‘is attached to Buonaparte,’ to ‘Privateering,’ and ‘Plunder’ and are the most disorderly set in the West Indies.” He also
noted—with the concern of a man whose reputation in the West Indies to this
point had been built on his success in defending the merchant trade from attack—that he had received reports of a force of up to twenty privateers waiting in the harbor at Pointe-à-Pitre (the main anchorage of Guadeloupe). He
believed they were waiting only for the “moment the tri-colored flag is hoisted
or that they hear of Hostilities having commenced” to begin wreaking havoc
on British trade. Durham then went on to assure the Admiralty that he would
do everything in his power to avoid being the first aggressor in the region.
He also reported to the Admiralty that he had asked for and received Linois’s
promise that the governor would not endorse any expedition to occupy two
valuable islands to the south of Guadeloupe, the Saintes. Finally, in a postscript
Durham warned that Duchesse d’Angoulême, a French frigate, had departed
for France, leaving only one French warship in the area. It is clear that at this
point Durham understood the fragile situation on and around Guadeloupe,
especially the weakness of its government, and the potential consequences of
that island declaring for Napoléon. Despite having received Melville’s direction
to engage in no hostile act against a ship carrying the tricolor flag, Durham left
four brigs—the maximum amount of force he could spare—to watch both for
any indication that privateers had begun to attack shipping and for the arrival
of any ships from the French mainland.55
Both Durham and Leith expected Vaugiraud to take immediate advantage
of the agreement but were surprised when, after being notified of Durham’s
readiness to land troops, the governor balked. Durham’s report to the Admiralty
describes the governor’s hesitation as resulting from fear of the reaction of the
inhabitants to the arrival of the British. However, in two letters to Durham, on
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29 May and 1 June, Vaugiraud asks Durham to postpone the arrival of the troops
until he can make proper arrangements to receive them, mentioning concerns
that some of the more recalcitrant Bonapartist soldiers should be sent back to
France first. Durham and Leith, both of them concerned about the health of the
British troops packed together in ships, were understandably upset, and they
leaned heavily on Vaugiraud to accept the troops.56
It also is worth noting that while Durham and Leith were exchanging letters
with Vaugiraud, Durham began to dictate a summary of his career-long exploits
and the several plaudits he had received for his service to king and country. As
Hilary Rubinstein observes in her book Trafalgar Captain, it appears that amid
preparations for an occupation of French territory and the potential onset of another world war, Durham was focused on memorializing himself.57
Ultimately, on 5 June the British auxiliary force landed safely on Martinique;
the forts were garrisoned in the name of Louis XVIII, with appropriate pomp and
circumstance; and the colony remained loyal to the French king. Recognizing that
the inhabitants of Martinique might be wary of the return of British troops to their
island, Leith and Vaugiraud took care to publish widely the terms of their agreement. They also tried to assuage the fears of the French colonists by incorporating
two conditions regarding the retention of Bourbon authority over the colony. Specifically, Leith guaranteed that the sovereign administration of Martinique would
remain under Vaugiraud’s control entirely, and that the British troops, as auxiliaries, would report to Vaugiraud for use as he saw fit to maintain Louis’s authority.58
The news of the British troops’ arrival on Martinique reached Guadeloupe
the next day, on 6 June, and the terms of the agreement between Leith and Vaugiraud were published there on 10 June. According to Linois’s deputy, Boyer,
news of the troops caused a significant uproar, while word of the agreement did
nothing to calm the population; in fact, according to Boyer, it was only his own
heroic efforts that prevented the island’s inhabitants from immediately declaring for Bonaparte.59 Writing to the Admiralty on the same day on which the
terms of the agreement were published, Durham offered a different perspective.
Because of Melville’s orders of 26 March, Durham had found it necessary to resist requests from Leith, Vaugiraud, and Linois to “act in any way hostile to the
tri-colored flag.” Clearly, Leith, Linois, and Vaugiraud had grown uncomfortable with the situation on Guadeloupe, realized that the arrival of orders from
Napoléon’s government would set the island on fire, and understood that the
Royal Navy was the only means of preventing this from happening. Durham
did not disagree with this conclusion, expressing his relief later in the same
letter that he was “happy to say [that no ship carrying Napoléon’s flag] had
. . . appeared yet in these seas.” He, however, appeared concerned that soon he
might be forced to act outside the restrictive bounds of Melville’s orders.60 So,
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by the second week of June the situation on Guadeloupe had reached a tipping
point—as had Admiral Durham.
Dispatched by Napoléon’s government from France on 9 May with a mission
to “rallier la Martinique et la Guadeloupe à la métropole,” the French schooner
L’Agile made its first landfall at Saint-François on the eastern side of Guadeloupe
on 12 June, carrying two letters for the governor.61 HMS Barrosa, one of the brigs
cruising around Guadeloupe at Linois’s request—to prevent exactly this type of
thing from happening—came upon L’Agile shortly after it left Saint-François.
Barrosa, ignorant of L’Agile’s success in already landing letters, determined the
schooner to be acting suspiciously and brought it to Durham, whose flagship
was anchored at the Saintes. Durham’s interrogation of L’Agile’s commander
revealed that the ship carried both the tricolor and the Bourbon flag, and that
the captain had instructions to fly the Bourbon flag when away from the coast to
fool any patrolling British ships. Most importantly, Durham learned that L’Agile
carried instructions and exhortations from Napoléon’s newly installed minister
of the navy and the colonies for the governors of Martinique and Guadeloupe,
as well as for all French warships still in the West Indies, to return themselves to
imperial rule. Likely remembering the rigid words of Melville’s orders, Durham
forwarded the dispatches to Linois on Guadeloupe and asked what he would like
done with them. Linois’s reply, revealing the increasing stress he felt in his position, was unambiguous. He asked Durham to send the dispatches to Vaugiraud,
who recently had learned of his appointment by Louis XVIII’s government in
exile as governor general of all the French West Indian colonies, to ask for his
advice and instruction. Tellingly, Linois also implored Durham—taking care to
refer to him as a friend—to have L’Agile forcibly escorted out of the West Indies
to ensure continued tranquility.62
At this point, Durham faced what seemed to be an easy choice: either confiscate the dispatches carried aboard L’Agile, and possibly the ship itself, or release
it to deliver the instructions. No act of aggression actually had occurred yet.
Barrosa had encountered L’Agile while the latter was flying the Bourbon flag, and
the French ship appears to have come peacefully to the Saintes, where, again, the
captain had surrendered the dispatches without any recorded violence. In other
words, Durham had stayed within the letter of his instructions and easily could
justify confiscating the imperial dispatches, if not L’Agile also. This is especially
true given the explicit request from the Bourbon governor of Guadeloupe to
do exactly that, which was in line with Bathurst’s orders to Leith. Even if the
confiscation of the imperial dispatches generated a protest from a yet-to-beestablished Napoleonic government in the distant future, it was extremely
unlikely that Durham would face censure from a government that had joined
in declaring Napoléon an outlaw and that had directed another commander
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in chief on the same station to give the royalist governors any assistance they
requested.
It is also possible to argue that it was in Durham’s best interest as the naval
commander in chief to confiscate the dispatches. Left unchecked, L’Agile had
instructions to provide the incendiary dispatches to any French warship it could
contact. While Durham knew that only one such warship remained, even that
single ship would have presented a significant threat to his diminished squadron
and the merchant shipping in the area. Additionally, as he had reported to the
Admiralty previously, Durham was concerned that the twenty or so privateers
in harbor at Pointe-à-Pitre in Guadeloupe were waiting only for a return of
Napoléon’s government to begin ravaging trade in the region. Finally, regardless
of what happened to Napoléon in Europe, in no way would Britain’s interests in
the West Indies be bettered by having a Bourbon government secured by British
power on Martinique and a Bonapartist government on Guadeloupe. Again, it is
extremely unlikely that a British commander in chief would face any discipline
or displeasure for taking measures to prevent depredation of British trade in the
West Indies. Nonetheless, Durham wrote to the Admiralty on 13 June that he did
not believe the “nature of his instructions” permitted him to do anything other
than return the dispatches and allow L’Agile to go wherever it chose.63
Unsurprisingly, the captain of L’Agile chose to proceed directly back to Guadeloupe, arriving at Basse-Terre on 15 June. Immediately on landing, the crew
distributed copies of the Moniteur and other newspapers, then gave dispatches
to the commander of the harbor. The ship’s captain, proudly displaying a tricolored cockade on his hat, proceeded through town to meet with the governor,
drawing an increasingly large and boisterous crowd as he went. Over the next
three days events proceeded exactly as Linois had feared when he asked Durham
to send the dispatches to Vaugiraud and to banish L’Agile from the West Indies.
The enthusiasm of the general population for Napoléon’s return followed a
path identical to that of the people in France. The arc of events culminated in
Linois—likely out of a sense of self-preservation rather than any overwhelming attachment to Napoléon’s cause—allowing the tricolor to be raised over the
island on 18 June and issuing his formal declaration of loyalty to Napoléon’s
government on 19 June.64
This proved too much for the island’s intendant, Jean François César de Guilhermy, a staunch royalist. He fled Guadeloupe for the Saintes on the night of 20
June, along with several other leading citizens of the colony. Two days later, Linois
sent an armed detachment to the island to deliver a letter to Guilhermy. In accordance with Durham’s orders, HMS Barbadoes, stationed at the Saintes to monitor
Guadeloupe, did not interfere with the armed party’s landing or its stay on the
island. In his letter to Guilhermy, Linois asserted that he had no other choice but to
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attach his own destiny to that of Bonaparte. He also requested that Guilhermy return to Guadeloupe to resume his post. At the same time, according to Guilhermy’s
personal papers, published in 1886, Linois threatened Guilhermy’s wife, who was
still in her house on Guadeloupe; the governor warned that he would keep her and
her children hostage until Guilhermy agreed to return. The threat did not persuade
Guilhermy or the others on the Saintes, who escaped aboard Barbadoes, leaving the
Saintes in the possession of the armed party from Guadeloupe. Guilhermy arrived
on Martinique on 26 June—one day after his family members did, who apparently
had not been held captive. Three days later, after receiving a report of events on
Guadeloupe, Vaugiraud, in his capacity as governor general of the French West
Indies, issued a proclamation dismissing Linois as governor of Guadeloupe.65
Meanwhile, Durham had returned to Guadeloupe on the morning of 18 June
and discovered the tricolor flying above all the fortifications. He apparently had
“long been in expectation of [it] taking place.” In his report of this news to the
Admiralty, Durham did not give an explicit reason for his return to Guadeloupe,
but his concern that he might be found at fault for releasing L’Agile and its dispatches was implied heavily by a postscript to the report. In it, Durham informed
the Admiralty that he had just learned that L’Agile had delivered dispatches at the
eastern side of Guadeloupe before Barrosa came into contact with it. He clearly
was trying to demonstrate that his release of L’Agile was not the sole cause of the
island declaring for Napoléon. Durham then informed his superiors in London
that he had sent an officer ashore to confer with Linois, whose reply convinced
him that the colony’s leadership now was dedicated fully to Napoléon’s cause.
Finally, wholly in line with Melville’s orders of 26 March, Durham informed the
Admiralty that once he heard of hostilities actually beginning he immediately
would place the island in a state of blockade.66
Having completed his report on the revolt of Guadeloupe, Durham next took
an action that baffled Leith. Shortly after 18 June, Durham wrote to Linois, informing him that, having received no orders to commence hostilities, he would
not interfere with any ship flying Napoléon’s flag, regardless of the mission on
which it was engaged. It did not matter whether the ship was engaged actively in
hostility toward Louis XVIII’s authority or bringing troops, weapons, and supplies to fortify Guadeloupe against a Bourbon reinvasion; Durham would not
permit his squadron to intervene unless his ships were attacked or he learned that
war had commenced between Britain and Napoléon’s France.67
This news circulated rapidly throughout British, Bourbon, and Bonapartist
circles, appropriately encouraging or enraging each audience as late as 22 July. At
the time, Leith could not comprehend why Durham’s ship had allowed the rebels
to seize the Saintes without opposition. Leith was troubled especially by Durham’s
decision to tell Linois that he effectively had a free hand to undermine Bourbon
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authority in the West Indies, and as a direct consequence put Leith’s troops on Martinique, and anywhere else they were assisting Bourbon forces, in danger.68
But the rationale behind Durham’s decision becomes clearer when viewed
through the lens of mission command. As previously discussed, Melville’s orders of
26 March overly constrained Durham’s available options. They limited too severely
the decision space available to Durham to deal with a unique and rapidly evolving
environment in which he could not hope to get clarification on a useful timescale.
Undiscussed to this point, however, is that Melville’s orders also failed to account for the personality and mind-set of the person receiving them. It is clear
that by the end of June 1815 Durham wanted to go home to England. He had
applied for a relief and been granted one, only to find that hope snatched away
at the last moment by Napoléon’s escape from Elba.69 Sensing the possibility of
another destructive world war, Durham was acutely aware of the degraded material state and decreasing numbers of the squadron he had available to protect
the vital commerce in his theater. This, in turn, could threaten the reputation he
had built throughout his entire career and affect his prospects at home; in fact,
he was concerned enough about this reputation to begin memorializing it while
busy preparing to land troops on Martinique. As with the L’Agile incident, Durham could have stayed well within the bounds of his orders simply by ordering
his ships not to interfere with French ships flying the tricolor; he did not need to
tell Napoléon’s sympathizers on Guadeloupe explicitly that they had a free hand
to do as they pleased. Durham’s broadcasting of his intention neither to interfere
with nor to intercept any of Napoléon’s ships likely only served to ensure that
none of those ships would act aggressively in the first place, which would have
forced Durham to start a conflict he did not want. When looked at in light of all
these stresses, it is clear that the restrictive nature of Melville’s orders, as well as
his explicit tying of Durham’s prospects of relief to the maintenance of peace,
provided Durham an excuse to do nothing and hope for the best. Put another
way, Melville’s orders did not take into account the mind-set of the commander
for whom they were intended; instead, they took away any incentive for boldness
or initiative and provided room for the admiral to equivocate.
The Back-and-Forth
Leith, of course, did not know any of this when he wrote his first contribution to
what turned out to be a seven-letter exchange. He simply was trying to accomplish his mission as he understood it, and Durham was doing things that both
did not make sense to him and could hinder significantly Leith’s ability to carry
out his own orders.
On 30 June, Leith wrote two letters to Durham. The first expressed Leith’s
general frustration at Durham’s decision to allow L’Agile to put into Guadeloupe, at Durham’s public insistence that he would not interfere even with ships
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/8
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bringing reinforcements to Guadeloupe that Leith’s troops eventually might have
to fight, and with Durham’s complete unwillingness to take a risk for the greater
good. Leith concluded the first letter by informing Durham that he had ordered
a body of soldiers to retake the Saintes, by force if necessary. Likely anticipating significant pushback from Durham, Leith asked only for Durham’s ships to
provide protection from aggression and to prevent the garrison on the Saintes
from communicating with Guadeloupe. The second letter was an extension of the
first. Leith informed Durham that, because of a communication from Vaugiraud
concerning events on Guadeloupe, Leith felt compelled to accelerate greatly his
preparations to make his army ready for offensive operations against any French
island that might declare for Napoléon. He again implored Durham to change his
policy of allowing French reinforcements to enter Guadeloupe, seeking to prevent
the island’s inevitable recapture from Bonapartist forces from being prohibitively
costly in blood and treasure.70
Durham’s reply on 1 July was extremely narrow in its scope and almost as acerbic in its tone, going well beyond the intent behind Melville’s orders. Durham, in
an overtly defensive and offended manner, stated plainly that he could not and
would not permit any ship under his command to be the first aggressor against
any force coming from Guadeloupe. Most surprisingly, Durham informed Leith
that only because the forces occupying the Saintes had withdrawn to Guadeloupe
would he permit his ships to intervene and protect Leith’s troops from attack. He
then went further, limiting that protection to “warn[ing] off any force that may
be sent from Guadeloupe.” In other words, Durham implied that if a French force
still had occupied the Saintes he would have required his ships to stand off and
watch an attack on British troops, and even if he did allow his ships to intervene
he would have permitted the French to attack first.71 His narrow interpretation of
Melville’s orders was clearly excessive. In no way did Melville intend for his commander in chief in the West Indies to stand by and watch British soldiers die, but
that is how Durham, intentionally or not, had construed his orders.
As it happened, the British successfully landed a force on the evacuated Saintes
on 4 and 5 July. However, Leith and Durham continued to exchange letters, as
Vaugiraud and Leith had decided to repossess Guadeloupe’s main islands forcibly.72
The two British commanders exchanged another four letters over the next
six days; the missives contained arguments and reasoning similar to those in
the previous three. On 2 July, Leith attempted to reason with Durham; most importantly, he sought to demonstrate that the two commanders should be able to
find a path to cooperation that would satisfy Durham’s narrow interpretation of
his orders. Leith’s line of argument laid out that he was acting in accordance with
the spirit and intent of the orders of the prince regent, not just his department
head, Bathurst, to support Louis XVIII’s government by employing force short of
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declaring war. Leith also argued that he considered anyone attempting armed rebellion against Louis’s authority, regardless of the flag under which it was done,
to have committed the first act of aggression against British and French troops.
Leith ended by asking Durham pointedly whether he would permit his ships
to protect the British troops on the Saintes from being attacked by troops and
weapons that Durham’s ships had allowed the French to deliver to Guadeloupe.73
Leith’s arguments convinced Durham only partly. On 4 July, the admiral
hastened to inform the general that he already had sent orders to his ships to
“prevent [any] renewed attempt at the repossession of that post, and when the
British have garrisoned it to keep all French ships of war under whatever flag
at a respectful distance.” However, that is as conciliatory as Durham got. The
rest of his letter was dedicated to legalistic arguments about how he could not
possibly allow his forces to become the aggressors. First, he argued that only if
the governor of Guadeloupe had requested assistance, as Vaugiraud had done at
Martinique, would he feel satisfied that the British were acting defensively. Then
he concluded that, because he had received “several communications from the
Admiralty subsequent [to Leith’s receipt of his 10 April orders from Bathurst],
all of which recommend to [him] a cautious line of conduct with respect to any
act of aggression against the French nation under whatever flag,” his naval forces
could not participate in an operation against Guadeloupe until he received orders
from Britain, which he expected to arrive at any moment.74
In his reply on 6 July, Leith shifted tactics, primarily attacking Durham’s legalistic arguments. He reminded Durham that Vaugiraud had been appointed governor general of all the French West Indies, and that in fact he had requested British
assistance—making Linois a rebel instead of a governor refusing assistance. He
also informed Durham that he had received another dispatch from Bathurst, dated
two days later than the last instruction Durham had referenced previously, again
instructing him to support and maintain Louis’s authority. Yet, not willing to base
his argument entirely on technicalities, Leith concluded the letter with a remarkable paragraph, writing, “The responsibility of every commander ought naturally
to oblige him to regulate the extent of his cooperation, in absence of direct orders,
by his zeal for the public service, and by his professional judgment founded on all
the circumstances of the case, while the principle of action is established by facts,
and do not, for that purpose, require the exercise of discretion.”75
Unsurprisingly, Durham was not swayed by this, and in the final letter of their
exchange, dated 7 July, he simply responded by restating the same argument he
had made since 30 June: that he could not and would not act offensively until the
Admiralty gave him permission to do so.76 Clearly, nothing Leith could say was
going to change Durham’s mind—he would do nothing differently until directly
ordered to do so.
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The Deadlock Broken
That order came quickly. On 10 July, having had enough of Leith questioning his
decisions, Durham prepared to forward the correspondence between the commanders in chief and began a letter to the Admiralty complaining that Leith was
“insisting [he] commence offensive operations.” He also took special care to call
attention to “the many extraordinary Arguments and Accusations that [Leith]
has brought forward,” in an attempt to “goad me into compliance.”77
If Durham had more to say about the pressure to which Leith was subjecting him, he never got a chance to record it. On 11 July, when he was halfway
through drafting the letter, Durham received Admiralty orders directing him
to cooperate with Leith.78 To his credit, Durham quickly informed Leith that he
was ready to do so. Perhaps fearing criticism from the Admiralty, however, he
also was quick to inform the lords that he had been preparing for the expedition “without intermission.”79 Given his strident opposition to Leith’s entreaties,
this was likely at best a bending of the truth, but one that would not affect the
overall operation.
Finally released from his narrow interpretation of Melville’s 26 March orders,
Durham lost no time in cooperating fully with Leith to prepare to retake Guadeloupe. Compared with the effort to launch the expedition, and contrary to Leith’s
fears, the assault on Guadeloupe was relatively uneventful. It began on 8 August,
and, despite spirited resistance, Linois and Boyer surrendered the island on 10
August after little loss of life. However, according to Leith’s report to Bathurst,
the attack had come just in time to prevent the return of the terrors of the French
Revolution, as several royalists apparently were due to be executed only five days
later, to mark Napoléon’s birthday. Somewhat surprisingly, Leith included in his
report fulsome praise for Durham’s efforts. Likewise, Durham heaped nothing
but accolades on Leith in his dispatch to the Admiralty.80
In the end, the events in the West Indies caused by Napoléon’s escape from
Elba concluded with no major consequences. Napoléon was defeated and exiled
again. British trade to and from the West Indies was not interrupted. Leith was
able to execute his orders and shore up Louis XVIII’s authority in the West Indies. Melville kept his promise, with Rear Admiral John Harvey being named as
Durham’s relief; Durham finally could go home. He even was able to bolster his
reputation further when, in the closing hours of the assault on Guadeloupe, a fort
close to Basse-Terre hauled down its flag on 10 August in response to bombardment from Durham’s flagship, HMS Venerable. On this basis, Durham claimed
for the remainder of his life that he had been present at, and responsible for, the
surrender of the first and last tricolor flags of the war.81 Even Linois was acquitted
by a court-martial in France, promoted in retirement to vice admiral, and created
a grand officer of the Legion of Honor.82
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When we look at these events only against a backdrop of insignificant consequences for the people involved and the minimal effect on the larger war, it is easy
to see why they largely have evaded analysis. But when we look at them through
the lens of mission command, their importance stands out.
APPLICATION OF THE MISSION-COMMAND FRAMEWORK
Mission command is a powerful tool, one that can provide a nuanced and more
compelling explanation of events during the age of sail, considered at all levels
of warfare. In the case of the events during the spring and summer of 1815 in
the West Indies, and especially in the case of the conflict between Durham and
Leith, using mission command as an analytical framework provides a much better explanation than the previously accepted narrative. It also provides important
lessons for modern commanders at the strategic and operational levels of war.
This article’s mission-command framework demonstrates clearly that the
cause of the dispute between Leith and Durham went much deeper than a difference in interpretation of orders or Durham’s alleged desire to avoid plunging
his “nation into a rash, and perhaps unnecessary, war.”83 Clearly, Melville and
Durham’s relationship, as evidenced by Melville’s orders and the communications
between the two, fits into the failure-of-mission-command category (the third
of the possibilities presented in the introduction). Not only did Durham fail to
achieve the desired end state by allowing Guadeloupe to fall into Bonapartist
hands, when minimal and nonaggressive action could have prevented it from
doing so, but Durham’s and Melville’s respective decision spaces barely aligned,
if they did so at all. This failure was primarily Melville’s. His orders were overly
restrictive, preventing Durham from adapting to a fast-changing situation or
taking advantage of his position on scene. Melville also failed to take Durham’s
mind-set into account when writing his subordinate’s orders. He knew Durham
had requested relief and wanted to return home, but he does not appear to have
anticipated how this might affect Durham’s actions on station. Taken together,
these failures created such a narrow potential decision space for Durham that
the orders both forced and allowed him to take actions that made no strategic
sense and could have complicated Britain’s position in the West Indies greatly if
Napoléon had fared differently in Europe.
On the other hand, at the operational level of war, the interaction between
Leith and Bathurst exemplifies the best execution of mission command (the first
of the possibilities presented in the introduction). Leith, operating with orders
that specified an end state and that used permissive language, made the most of
his initiative by securing Martinique quickly, preventing an imminent uprising
there. Bathurst’s orders to Leith also clearly were well tailored to Leith’s mind-set
and the trust existing between the two. This is demonstrated by the fact that Leith
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did not feel the need to ask for clarification or further orders; he understood what
was required of him, and he trusted that his actions would receive Bathurst’s support, despite whatever consequences Durham’s actions might have brought about.
This is demonstrated even more powerfully by the extract from Leith’s last letter
to Durham, quoted above; while Leith obviously had no familiarity with the term
mission command, he clearly understood, and strove to apply, its core concepts.84
Modern commanders can draw two lessons from Melville’s failure of mission command and from Bathurst’s best application of the same. The first is the
difficulty in crafting adequate mission orders. Put simply, word choice matters.
As Melville found out, overly restrictive language can restrict the subordinate’s
perceived decision space to the point where it brings about unintended consequences, even at the strategic level of war. Permissive language, on the other
hand, allows a subordinate freedom to maneuver and adapt, as Leith did. A commander must consider whether the orders in question define an appropriate decision space for the subordinate or instead will remove potential courses of action
that should have been available.
Implicit in this is an understanding of the subordinate for whom the orders
are intended. A subordinate who is energetic and willing to take risks, whether
to his or her physical safety or personal reputation, might be trusted with more
latitude in orders. A subordinate who is too reckless or aggressive may need to be
restrained, whereas a subordinate who is too timid may need to be forced into action. So, when crafting mission orders, modern commanders should take care to
use language that shapes and appropriately constrains the subordinate’s decision
space. As demonstrated above, permissive language usually will provide better
results than constrictive wording.
The second lesson commanders can draw concerns the importance of intent.
Even precise wording of orders still can prove insufficient if a subordinate does
not understand why the commander wants an objective to be achieved. If Melville
had written even a few lines to Durham in the 26 March orders explaining why he
was to avoid hostilities, Durham likely would have been in a much better position
to adapt his restrictive orders to a changing situation. In contrast, Bathurst’s orders
to Leith demonstrate the power of intent. Simply by telling Leith that the prince
regent desired the French West Indian islands to remain faithful to Louis XVIII,
Bathurst gave Leith the confidence to adapt to the situation. This lesson is applicable to all three levels of war. Explanation of the intent behind orders, then, is the
most powerful tool a modern commander has when applying mission command.
Mission command never has been more important than in the current era of
great-power competition, because it is one of the strongest methods by which to
leverage the advantages inherent in decentralized command in today’s rapidly
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022

29

122

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [2022], No. 3, Art. 8

evolving battle space.85 This is especially true with the emergence of the cyber and
space domains of warfare. However, mission command is neither simple nor easy
to use effectively. To reap the full benefits made available by mission command,
practitioners must both practice it in day-to-day operations and study the past
for lessons learned previously.
The age of sail is a gold mine for those lessons at all levels of warfare and
complexity. As previously mentioned, historians already have succeeded in
drawing mission-command-related lessons from the age of sail at the tactical
and operational levels of war. However, this article’s framework provides a standardized and more rigorous analytical method for future study than that applied
previously. There are many other examples from the age of sail at all levels of
war—such as Graves at the Battle of the Capes, Calder in the Trafalgar campaign,
and Berkeley in the Peninsular War—that should be mined for military-related
mission-command lessons.
The case study presented in this article was particularly complicated. Politics
and diplomacy played an important role; events changed rapidly and unexpectedly when Napoléon returned; there was a long lead time in communications
between commanders and subordinates; and two separate British ministers with
different priorities issued orders to two different military commanders, with
no theater commander to provide a unified chain of command. Because of all
these elements and challenges, the case provides an extremely tough test of the
mission-command system—and equally valuable lessons.
This further demonstrates the utility of this framework and of the idea of
mission command at the strategic level of war, because it can be applied to situations involving all the instruments of national power, not just the military. For
example, applying this framework to Collingwood’s time in the Mediterranean
or Saumarez’s in the Baltic likely would provide senior admirals and generals
with invaluable lessons in the application of diplomacy, information, and economics—something they face on an increasingly frequent basis in today’s era of
great-power competition.
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